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Categorizing Patterns and Processes in Retail Grocery 
Internationalisation 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The last two decades have been characterised by an increasing internationalisation of 
retail activity and a considerable number of academic attempts to classify or 
categorise this activity.  A number of different classifications have been proposed 
based mainly on interactions amongst geographical spread, market entry, managerial 
outlook and managerial flexibility.  However, an examination of three leading 
international grocery chains on such criteria reveals little communality in pattern or 
process.  Instead internationalisation is marked by different, perhaps serendipitous, 
patterns and by periods of retrenchment and reconsideration of activities, within a 
generic strategy of front of store adaptation and back of store standardisation.  
Previous classifications are therefore partial, time-bound semi-descriptions which 
need to be supplemented by detailed long-term examination of the internationalisation 
activities and  processes of individual companies. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Retail, Internationalisation, Globalisation, Classification, Grocery.  
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Categorizing Patterns and Processes in Retail Grocery Internationalisation 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the search for explanation we inevitably simplify.  The outcome of complex 
processes are codified and categorised into classifications and typologies as we seek 
order and explanation.   Despite arguments that retailing has particular characteristics 
that distinguish it from many other industrial sectors, there is a tendency to draw upon 
established concepts and frameworks derived in other circumstances to provide 
convenient labels and typologies which simplify our descriptions of a complex retail 
phenomenon. 
 
The growing focus on retailing as a process rather than an activity, and upon the 
organisation and management of value chain activities as a framework for 
understanding retail internationalisation is no different.  At a macro level, the value 
chain approach emphasises differences in retail contexts which influence how 
activities and behaviours are shaped throughout the value chain.  In the search for 
order and simplification we may, however, ignore significant variations in behaviour 
and outcomes.  This paper seeks to explore the extent to which a common strategy for 
internationalisation can be found within the context of one retail value chain.  
 
We start by exploring the broad themes of geographical expansion and operational 
process which are found within existing attempts to categorise retail 
internationalisation.  These themes are then considered within the retail grocery sector 
through the cases of three European based grocery retailers, who would appear to be 
the most international or “global” in terms of the scope of their activities.  Finally, 
from the experiences of these three companies we assess whether our current 
categorisations and understanding of patterns and processes of retail grocery 
internationalisation are adequate. 
 
Patterns and Processes in Retail Internationalisation 
 
There have been numerous attempts to classify retail internationalisation.  The 
terminology used is, however, inconsistent and at times contradictory (Helferich et al 
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1997).  Despite this, within the various frameworks proposed over the last two 
decades of research, two themes consistently emerge.  First, the geographical spread 
of markets, related to the number of countries entered and the concepts of 
geographical and cultural distance.  Secondly, the degree of responsiveness or 
adaptation to local market conditions, whether at the level of the firm, format or 
brand.  These considerations have structured much of the study of retail 
internationalisation and attempts to codify patterns and processes.  
 
Geographical Spread: direction and sequence 
 
The geographical dimension of retail internationalisation is a common theme in the 
academic literature, typified by studies measuring who went where, when, and how.  
Studies have charted specific geographical flows (eg Kacker, 1985; Hamill and 
Crosbie, 1990; and Muniz-Martinez, 1998), or the activities of individual companies 
(eg Wrigley 1997a; 1997b; 2000; Laulajainen 1991a, 1991b).  Geographical spread is 
typically measured by the number of markets in which a retailer operates. Attempts to 
explain these geographical patterns have led to explorations of related issues such as: 
the motives for internationalisation (e.g. Williams, 1991; Alexander 1990, 1995, 
Quinn 1999, and Vida 2000); the role and choice of entry mechanism (Burt 1991, 
1995; Quinn 1998; Doherty 2000); and most recently patterns and explanations for 
divestment (Alexander and Quinn, 2002; Burt, Dawson and Sparks, 2003; 2004; 
Alexander, Quinn and Cairns, 2005).   
 
Research into the patterns of retail internationalisation has suggested that companies 
move first into geographically or culturally close markets.  As familiarity with 
international markets and the operational issues involved increases over time, they 
then move further afield into more culturally, often geographically, distant markets.  
This spreading pattern, based on the concept of psychic distance, mirrors the stages 
approach to internationalisation in the international and export marketing literature. 
  
In a retail context, Treadgold (1990) proposed a three stage model of expansion in 
geographical presence over time.  Retailers passed through stages of reluctance, 
caution and ambition, as they became more pro-active in their response to 
international market opportunities and experience curve effects influenced managerial 
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perceptions of risk.  A link to the Uppsala school is also explicit in the work of Vida 
and Fairhurst (1998), who suggest that the decision to enter a market will be 
determined by a company’s capacities (firm characteristics) and management 
perceptions (decision maker characteristics).  As experience grows, retailers 
overcome these inhibitors and become more ambitious in their strategic outlook. 
 
Although intuitively appealing, the concept of psychic distance is loosely defined and 
often lacks empirical support.  Evans and Mavondo (2002) differentiate between 
distance and uncertainty, and suggest evidence of a psychic distance paradox, 
whereby performance is enhanced in more “distant” countries.  This builds on the 
observations of O’Grady and Lane (1996, 1997) who found that in the case of 
Canadian retailers operating in the USA, cultural “closeness” did not guarantee 
success. Despite this evidence base the concept of staged expansion related to cultural 
proximity is still widely advocated. 
 
Market Entry: managing risk and control 
 
Broad strategic issues such as entry method, with its implications for cost and control, 
have also been integrated into existing frameworks.  The choice of entry method is 
viewed as one way of minimising risk and overcoming perceptions of cultural 
distance. Treadgold (1988) used geographical presence (defined as concentrated, 
dispersed, multinational and global), and entry and operating strategy, (represented by 
levels of cost and control), to identify four types of international retailer:  the cautious 
internationalists, who use high cost entry mechanisms (internal growth or acquisition) 
to expand in one or two markets; the emboldened internationalists, also with high cost 
entry mechanisms but operating in a wider spread of markets; the aggressive 
internationalists, who have high cost entry methods over a very wide spread of 
markets; and the world powers, characterised by low cost entry mechanisms 
(franchising) and a large international presence.    
 
In their study on the European retail grocery sector, Gielens and Dekimpe (2001) 
consider the impact of five entry decision dimensions on performance.  They suggest 
that higher performance and efficiencies arise from early entry, with substantial scale, 
without partners or acquired assets, offering a format new to the market but familiar 
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to the company.  This study again emphasises the significance of strategic business 
decisions and managerial approaches in what can often be seen as simply a process of 
market led geographical dispersion.  
 
Managerial Outlook: corporate culture and management approach 
 
Other typologies combine geographical spread with managerial outlook, and in 
particular the cultural orientation of the business.  For example, Helferich et al (1997) 
use four criteria: geographical spread; a cultural dimension, encompassing both 
presence in different cultural zones (as opposed to number of markets) and cultural 
business orientation (ethnocentric, polycentric, mixed and geocentric); a marketing 
perspective, seen as the degree of standardisation or local market adaptation; and a 
management perspective, defined as the locus of operational control.  On this basis 
they distinguish between international retailers, beginners or slow developers whose 
aspirations are limited to one or two culturally similar neighbouring markets; global 
retailers, fast developers or inimitable niche retailers who have expanded beyond their 
own cultural zone and/or continent; transnational retailers, viewed as accumulators of 
experience who develop at a more steady pace with an emphasis on decentralisation 
or customisation; and multinational retailers who are portfolio managers operating 
separate units in a wide range of geographically cultural environments.  
 
Similarly, Alexander and Myers (2000) combined market and corporate dimensions 
through the constructs of market extension (high or low degrees of market coverage) 
and corporate perspectives (the degree of ethnocentricity or geocentricity).  The latter 
dimension incorporates considerations of control mechanisms, market responsiveness, 
corporate values and international responsiveness.  Their classification defines 
retailers as proximal, multinational, transnational and global.  Both proximal and 
multinational retailers retain an ethnocentric perspective to internationalisation, whilst 
the transnational and global companies develop the managerial competences which 
facilitate internationalisation.  Owing to its geocentric mindset, the global retailer may 
adapt their operations to suit the local market. 
 
The management perspective – the way in which the company organises and projects 
itself is also evident in the two “competing” corporate models of “globalized retail 
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operations” identified by Wrigley (2002): the intelligently federal umbrella 
organization model, which is characterised by partnerships and alliances, skill and 
knowledge transfer, format adaptation, and systems integration; and the aggressively 
industrial category killer model characterised by centralised bureaucracy, exported 
corporate cultures, and limited format adaptation.   
 
Managerial Flexibility: replication and adaptation 
 
The above classifications combine some measure of geographical spread with 
management perceptions of how to respond to international risk.  Inherent in these 
approaches is a consideration of market responsiveness and operational flexibility, 
whether directly through a prescribed approach to operational activities or inherent in 
an underlying behavioural approach to international markets.   
 
Salmon and Tordjman (1989) identify three strategies for retail internationalisation at 
the level of the firm.  The first of these is a purely financial investment in a foreign 
operation which entails little day-to-day involvement.  The global strategy requires a 
high level of standardisation in marketing and operational activities.  Economies of 
scale and replication are sought, and a distinctive product range or brand, backed by a 
high degree of central control and vertical integration within the value chain, is a 
common feature.  The alternative, a multinational strategy, requires a multi-domestic 
approach in which marketing activities and operational decisions are made on a 
country by country basis, tailored to local market and competitive conditions. 
 
At the format level, Goldman (2001) suggests six transfer strategies when entering a 
developing market.  Again these options revolve around the degree of managerial 
flexibility or adaptation of a core retail concept.  Whilst the global niche and 
opportunism options dove-tail with the traditional global or multinational views, 
Goldman suggests other options which are variations on a theme.  The format 
pioneering opportunity strategy, involves the development of a “regional” format 
which is replicated within a specific part of the world; the format extension 
compatible country of origin strategy, applies to the transfer of a home format with 
limited changes; and the portfolio based format extension, involves a similar transfer 
but based on a non-domestic format.  Finally the competitive positioning orientated 
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strategy entails a maximisation of the key strengths of the format in light of existing 
indigenous competition. 
 
Finally, others such as McGoldrick (1998), Burt and Carralero-Encinas (2000), and 
Burt and Mavrommatis (2006) narrow the level of analysis to the standardisation and 
replication of store and corporate image transfer across national boundaries. 
 
The Product Sector Lens 
 
The examples used to illustrate the various typologies discussed above tend to 
categorise grocery retailers as being inclined towards markets with a closer cultural fit 
and exhibiting more market adapted operational strategies, whilst non-food retailers 
(particularly in fashion and other “lifestyle” related categories) exemplify a rapid 
geographical spread to far-flung markets in a largely standardised manner.  In short, a 
“product sector” layer is often transposed on existing frameworks, reflecting 
differences in the configuration of value chains.  
 
This dimension is further illustrated by research into the internationalisation of the 
fashion sector (eg Moore 1996, 1997; Fernie et al, 1997; Moore et al, 2000; Doherty, 
2000; Picot-Coupey, 2006: Burt et al 2006a). Although primarily focusing on the 
choice of entry mode and the entry decision, these studies suggest that the specific 
characteristics of this sector, with a more highly integrated value chain, imply a 
different process and an evolution in approach as markets are entered and developed.  
Inherent in this work is the notion of evolution and change over time, a further 
important consideration in the internationalisation process. 
 
The value chain perspective on retail internationalisation, perhaps most evident in the 
global versus multinational strategy debate, further emphasises the sector context.  
The very nature of the grocery market suggests a more localised (and adapted) value 
chain in terms of consumer orientated market activities, and the structure of the 
supply chain, although operational processes show increasing signs of coordination 
and replication across geographical markets. 
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Context and Approach 
 
A criticism that can be levelled at many of the attempts to categorise retail 
internationalisation is the broad and somewhat selective approach to the evidence 
base.  Internationalisation in most retail firms is complex and dynamic and so support 
for any framework can be gained by selecting an event within the complex process of 
the firm.  It is possible in the literature to see the same firms being used to provide 
support for competing interpretive frameworks, because specific events at different 
times in the internationalisation process of the firm have been selected. 
 
This paper takes a different starting point for its analysis.  It begins from the “ground” 
up.  To do this, three retailers with a long history of involvement in retail 
internationalisation are examined.  For each company secondary records obtained via 
Annual Reports and the trade press are used to build up a picture of their international 
activities and approaches over the past four decades.  By looking at the patterns and 
processes in practice over an extended period, it is anticipated that more can be said 
about our categorizations and classifications, and the dynamics involved.  It is, 
however, accepted that this focus is in itself selective and should be replicated in other 
sectors and with other cases. 
 
The grocery sector is chosen for its scale and significance in internationalisation.  
However, the nature of grocery retailing raises several contradictions in terms of retail 
internationalisation and the attempts to categorise international retailers.  What is 
essentially a culture bound product market, with national and regional differences in 
diet, taste, and attitudes to food preparation translated into consumption and shopping 
behaviour is increasingly served by large non-domestic organisations, seeking 
international economies of scale, scope and replication.  The tension between serving 
the needs of local customers whilst leveraging organisational scale is evident and 
poses specific issues for the value chain.  Can grocery markets in different countries 
be served by a firm using a common retail strategy?  Is there a “preferred” business 
model for grocery internationalisation?  What are the generic aspects, if any, of 
grocery retailing and what aspects are specific to consumer cultures? 
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For several years, M+M Planet Retail have produced listings of the major grocery 
based retailers by total sales.  Just as the total sales ranking (Table 1) reflects the size 
of the domestic American and the larger European markets, when one considers 
internationalisation by the proportion of total sales which are made outside the home 
country a different array of retailers emerge. Given the size of the domestic market it 
is not surprising that the American chains achieve a relatively lower proportion of 
total sales from non-domestic markets than their European counterparts.  This 
exercise also emphasises some retailers from smaller European markets (eg Belgium 
and the Netherlands), where one could argue that internationalisation is inevitable to 
maintain sales growth.  Furthermore, the European based organisations in this table, 
with the exception of Delhaize, also operate in at least a dozen markets, illustrating a 
significant international spread of operations, which as discussed earlier is an 
important criterion in categorisations of international retailers. From these 
perspectives one could argue that the “true” leaders of retail internationalisation are 
the European based chains, 
     
    [Table 1 here] 
 
Data from Retail Forward for the previous year allow the origin of sales to be 
combined with the number of countries within which organisations operate, creating a 
visual representation of international ‘reach’ (Figure 1).  In terms of the proportion of 
sales achieved from non-domestic markets and the spread of markets, four broad 
groupings can be identified.  The first contains those organisations achieving under 
20% of sales from a handful (typically 5-7) markets; the second group encompassing 
Auchan, Aldi, Tesco and Wal-Mart, achieve a higher proportion of sales (20-40%) 
from a wider range of markets (10-15);  The third group represents further 
international commitment either through more markets (Ito-Yokado and Casino) 
and/or a greater proportion of non-domestic sales (Tengelmann and Schwarz); finally 
the “outliers” comprise of Carrefour and Metro with substantial sales (circa 50%) 
from a wide range of  markets (circa 30), and Delhaize and Ahold with dominant 
international sales (circa 80%) from fewer markets (<20). 
     
[Figure 1 here] 
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We will now consider three of the most international grocery retailers as illustrated by 
Figure 1: Ahold of the Netherlands; Carrefour of France; and the Delhaize Group of 
Belgium.  Despite its “position” Metro is not considered in this analysis because of 
the high proportion (50%+) of non-food sales. The scale and scope of the 
international operations of these three companies over the past fifteen years is 
presented in Table 2. This table instantly highlights differences between the 
companies in terms of the size and spread of the store portfolio.  The subsequent 
discussion will be structured to follow the themes identified in our earlier review of 
existing attempts to classify retail internationalisation.    
     
Discussion  
 
Corporate Goals, Objectives and Intent 
 
What do the activities and public pronouncements of these three experienced 
international grocery retailers show us?  Table 3 considers the stated goal or ambition 
and intent of the respective groups at mid 2006.  Typically the broad vision statements 
encompass a mixture of stakeholder perspectives and are often framed in terms of 
how others perceive them.  Carrefour and Delhaize phrase their ambition within a 
performance-benchmarking type perspective, namely to be the “point of reference for 
modern retailing” (Carrefour) and “to be one of the most admired international food 
retailers” (Delhaize).  A similar emphasis was found in Ahold in the late 1990s :“to 
be the best and most successful food provider in the world”  but has given way to “we 
make life easy for our customers to choose the best – for themselves and the people 
they care about” .     
    [Table 3 here] 
 
As one might expect from major companies in the retail sector all three comment on 
the need to reflect local customer needs in their operations.  They state that formats 
and channels need to be based on customer needs in individual markets, whilst the 
identification of core competencies reflect a combination of format and store 
innovation with operational efficiency and excellence.  All support their broad vision 
with statements acknowledging the importance of scale at the local level within host 
markets.  Delhaize refers to itself as an international group of local companies, and 
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aims for its various businesses to be amongst the leading three chains in their 
respective regions.  This view is echoed in Ahold’s recent Retail Review (November 
2006) which states the aim of becoming “market leaders in local food markets”, 
defined as the number one or two position in that market.  In Carrefour’s case scale is 
articulated as “powerful” networks, and the role of complimentarity amongst its 
trading formats is also regularly voiced.   
 
The need to react to and adapt to local customers and local market trading conditions, 
plus the importance of establishing scale at the national market level reflects the 
characteristics of the grocery market value chain, and has been recognised in the 
literature. Such a stance should, logically, have implications for the choice of markets, 
scope of investment and decisions about divestment, and the approaches taken to 
operating in international markets. 
 
Geographical Presence: spread, scope and entry method 
 
The first common theme in the academic literature is the geographical pattern of 
internationalisation, encompassing both the geographical spread and scope of 
investment and the market entry mechanisms employed (Table 4).  As far as the 
geographical pattern of investment is concerned, all three companies have at one time 
operated on at least three continents, although expansion patterns exhibit marked 
differences, and in all cases some degree of retrenchment and country exit has 
occurred.   
 
i) expansion 
 
There is little evidence of a clear pattern (or indeed commonality) in respect to either 
geographical or cultural proximity.  Carrefour was the first to move into non-domestic 
markets in 1969, with joint ventures into Belgium and Italy.  During the mid 1970s, 
first Delhaize and then Ahold invested in the North American market, one which 
Carrefour initially ignored (and then failed in at the end of the 1980s), in preference 
for the “core” European and Latin American markets.  While one might possibly 
claim some cultural “proximity” for the Dutch and Belgian moves into to the USA, an 
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overview of the first five or six markets entered, before the “rush” of the mid 1990s 
shows a widely dispersed pattern (Table 5). 
 
    [Table 4 here] 
 
Although Ahold is often regarded as being a long-established international player, 
prior to the 1990s investment was confined to the group’s first attempt to establish 
itself in Spain between 1976 and 1985, and consolidation in the US with the initial 
acquisition of Bi-Lo in 1977, followed by Giant Food Stores (1981), First National 
Supermarkets (1988) and Tops (1993).  Ahold’s pattern of entry into Spain through 
the formation of CadaDia in 1976; the acquisitions in the USA from 1977; greenfield 
entry into Czechoslovakia in 1991; the replacement of Delhaize in an existing joint 
venture in Portugal in 1992; and entry into Poland in 1995 via a joint venture with a 
German company (Allkauf), implies more support for the market opportunity (market 
pull) thesis than a pre-planned strategy based on geographical or cultural proximity.   
A noted omission from Ahold’s movements, until the ICA joint venture of 1999, is 
any significant investment in the “core” European markets.  Prior to this, Ahold’s 
European presence had entailed the Czechoslovakian, Portuguese and Polish ventures 
noted above, plus a return to Spain in 1996.  In all of these markets (with the 
exception of Portugal), Ahold was required to build up chains from a very low base, 
rather than investing in existing chains, its common pattern elsewhere. 
 
A diffused geographical pattern also characterises Delhaize’s early moves into foreign 
markets.  The 1974 acquisition of a stake in Food Town Stores (later renamed Food 
Lion) in the USA, was followed by entry into Germany (1977-79), Portugal (1981-
92), Czechoslovakia (1991) and Greece (1992).  Finally, while the early moves of 
Carrefour in the 1970s imply some degree of geographical or cultural proximity 
(Belgium 1969; Italy 1969; Switzerland 1970; UK 1972; Spain 1973; Brazil 1975; 
Austria 1976; and Germany 1977), this mix of markets of different sizes and 
competitive situations, and the subsequent retrenchment within Europe in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, suggests that market opportunity for the “new” hypermarket 
innovation in “less mature” markets is an equally valid explanation for market choice.  
The opportunism thesis and random walk argument (Dawson 2001) may provide a 
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better foundation for explaining these initial patterns of investment, rather than 
attempts to link or ‘force’ patterns to fit the geographical or cultural proximity thesis. 
 
    [Table 5 here] 
 
The geographical pattern exhibited by Carrefour is particularly opaque if one is 
searching for the linkages expected from the literature.  Following withdrawal from a 
number of European markets in the early 1980s, the end of that decade saw ventures 
into the USA (1988) and Taiwan (1989).  It was during the 1990’s however that 
Carrefour really expanded to all corners of the globe, including some of those 
European markets that it had previously abandoned (e.g. Italy, Belgium and 
Switzerland).  The company’s thirtieth anniversary in 1993 saw a “sea change” in 
international strategy.  Countries were defined as “core mature markets” (France and 
Spain), where the future emphasis would be on raising competitiveness; “growth 
opportunity markets” (Brazil, Argentina, Portugal and Taiwan), where scope existed 
for further expansion of established businesses; and “new markets” (Italy, Malaysia, 
Turkey), where entry was at its initial stages.  This strategy realignment led to the 
closure of the American operation, and a major Asian expansion to supplement the 
existing Taiwanese business, with entry into Malaysia, China, Hong Kong, Thailand, 
South Korea, Singapore, Indonesia, and Japan between 1994 and 2000.  In Latin 
America, the established Brazilian and Argentinian presence was complemented by 
entry into Mexico (1994), plus Chile and Columbia (1998), whilst in Europe between 
1997 and 2001 new markets included Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania 
and a return to Switzerland, whilst the Promodès merger in 1999 consolidated its 
presence in many existing markets. 
 
From observation of the timing and destination of these international moves, one 
could argue that changes in political or market circumstances, making specific 
countries attractive or accessible at specific time periods, were key determinants of 
the patterns exhibited by these three companies.  The common denominator in the 
geographical pattern of expansion is the universal rush to Asia in the mid 1990s.  The 
liberalisation of foreign ownership and general “opening up” of many markets in this 
part of the world, with favourable demographics and growing economies, and which 
would  be generally perceived as underdeveloped in modern retailing terms, may be 
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the most plausible explanation for this investment.  It is also possible to argue for 
“herding” in which firms copy the activities of others in a view that risk, in the 
intrinsically high risk strategy of international market entry, has been evaluated by 
others to be acceptable. The short term Asian economic crisis at this time also made 
investments affordable and available (Davies 2000).  Likewise politico-economic 
changes underpin moves into Central Europe, and Ahold’s rapid expansion into, and 
Carrefour’s market consolidation in Latin America in the late 1990s.  Expediency and 
change at the level of the firm is also evident in the case of investments in companies 
with existing international operations, as in the case of Ahold in Latin America and 
Scandinavia, and Carrefour’s acquisitions of “domestic” companies – Euromarché 
(1991), Comptoirs Modernes (1998) and most significantly Promodès (1999) – all of 
which added international store networks and potentially changed the “direction” of 
international strategy.  The Promodès merger also introduced the enlarged group to 
franchising – a method which has most recently been employed to enter a number of 
Middle Eastern markets 
 
ii) retrenchment 
 
Table 5 and the discussions above also show a number of withdrawals from markets.  
As noted earlier, academics have recently identified this as an important dynamic 
within the retail internationalisation process.  All three companies have exited markets 
at different times and in various circumstances.  Additionally, Table 6 does not show 
other changes in store networks and ownership within countries, for example store 
disposals in the USA by Ahold and Delhaize.  There are examples of exit and return 
to specific markets: Ahold in Spain; Delhaize in Germany; and Carrefour in Belgium, 
Italy (twice); Turkey and the UK (although the second venture also failed).  In other 
cases, markets have been exited without return.  Although Ahold’s financial problems 
distort the picture, there was clear sign of pressure in the Asian region before its 
crisis, as Ahold restructured its activities and withdrew from Singapore and China in 
1999.  Carrefour, like others who attempted to take the hypermarket format into the 
USA, quickly withdrew from the market (Tordjman, 1988), and also exited from 
Germany, the UK and Hong Kong.  The review of activities instigated by a new 
management team in 2003-04 has subsequently led to retreat from Chile (2003), 
hypermarkets in Portugal (2004), from Mexico, Japan, and the Czech and Slovak (all 
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2005) and South Korea (2006), markets “where the Group was no longer on a 
position to maintain its leadership position” (Annual Report, 2005).  Finally, the 
Delhaize departures from Portugal (1992), France (2001) and Singapore (2003) all 
relate to joint ventures where the partners changed or decided to withdraw, whilst exit 
from Thailand (2004) Slovakia (2005) and the forthcoming sale of Delvita in the 
Czech republic (2007), were rationalised in terms of the scale of investment necessary 
to achieve leading positions in these markets : “The Group concluded that the 
financial and HR resources required to gain a profitable presence in the Thai market 
would be more beneficial when invested in other assets.” (Annual Report , 2004). 
 
Given the large number of individual markets and both entry and exit activities 
observed across these three companies, one perhaps surprising outcome of the 
geographical spread of activities is that there are no markets where all three are in 
direct competition.   Bi-polar competition is, as one might expect, more common, but 
again a mix of pairings is evident.  Ahold and Delhaize “compete” in the USA; 
Delhaize and Carrefour meet in Belgium, Greece, Romania, and Indonesia, while 
Ahold and Carrefour now only face each other in Portugal, a market from which 
Ahold has announced its intention to withdraw.  One would not wish to propose a 
potentially spurious pattern of competitive “avoidance”, but given the importance of 
achieving scale and leadership in national markets which is increasingly articulated in 
company statements, such avoidance and the consequent limited level of “head-on” 
competition would seem to be a likely outcome of corporate strategy. 
 
One consequence of the recent reassessment of market portfolios, is that asset 
“swops” are in effect now occurring.   Internationalising retailers, including those who 
are relatively new to internationalisation, have the opportunity to acquire sites, stores 
or chains in countries from other international retailers (rather than local market 
operators) eg Wal-Mart has expanded in Central and Southern America through the 
acquisition of parts of the Ahold empire; Tesco and Carrefour have “swopped” stores 
in South Korea and the Czech and Sloavak Republics – although the latter deal has 
run into problems with the national competition authority.  A consequence of this is 
that the international spread of these moves, the nature of the assets and the associated 
relationships in the acquisition process follow a very different pattern to those of 
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initial market entry.  This is symptomatic of a maturing market for retail assets 
internationally and has not surprisingly attracted the attention of regulators  
 
iii) entry and expansion methods 
 
All three companies appear, via their choice of entry methods, to appreciate the need 
(or legal obligation) for a partner in most international markets.  Managerial control is 
usually sought, and this is particularly evident in the case of Carrefour and Delhaize.  
Carrefour’s traditional pattern of investment is one of joint venturing and partnering 
followed by consolidation (or divestment) as market share and performance grows (or 
stagnates) (Burt, 1994).  The merger with Promodès introduced a wider range of 
management control mechanisms with franchising and affiliation more prevalent than 
in the past, and actively pursued in certain markets.  It is, however, notable that the 
“core” hypermarket business remains predominantly a Carrefour controlled activity.  
Whilst Carrefour now only directly controls 58% of the circa 12,000 stores trading 
under the group’s various fascias, only 9% of the hypermarket network is franchised, 
compared to 93% of the convenience stores inherited from Promodès.  The origins of 
Promodès as a wholesaler are reflected in the intensity of this small store network and 
the management control mechanisms employed.      
 
Similarly, Delhaize has either taken a controlling stake or where possible moved from 
majority joint venture partnerships to majority shareholdings in most of its 
international markets, whilst adding scale to its American operation through the 
purchase of Food Giant (1980); Giant Food Markets (1984); Super Discount Markets 
(1986); Kash n Karry (1996); Food Fair (1996); Farmer Jack (1999); Hannaford 
(2000); Harveys (2003) and Victory Super Markets (2004).  The importance of 
consolidation (Wrigley 2001) within the American market was further underlined in 
the l999/2000 period, when Delhaize restructured its American activities into a new 
subsidiary Delhaize America.  This newly consolidated operation was then listed on 
the NYSE, but Delhaize has since repurchased the stock replacing the NYSE listing 
with Delhaize Group shares.   
 
The Ahold 1992 Annual Report stated: “both in the mature Western European 
markets and in other areas, Ahold is looking for expansion opportunities through 
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acquisition, participation or co-operation”.  Acquisitions in the USA, entailing the 
purchase of seven chains, three substantial blocks of stores, and the Peapod e-
commerce business between 1994 and 2002 (plus an aborted bid in 1999 for Pathmark 
Stores when the Federal Trade Commission intervened), were matched with mostly 
joint venture investments elsewhere.  Outside the North American market Ahold 
could, from a review of entry mechanisms, be seen to exhibit “looser” control over its 
international operations; an observation which rather ironically reflects practices 
which almost brought the company to its knees in 2003.  Rapid geographical 
expansion outside the USA was achieved via four substantial “multi-entry” joint 
venture arrangements: with Disco-Ahold International Holdings (providing entry into 
Argentina, Chile, Peru and Paraguay); CARHCO (Costa Rica and Nicaragua); Piaz-
Ahold (El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras) and ICA-Ahold (Sweden, Norway, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, and Lithuania), whilst legal requirements also 
required joint ventures in some Asian markets entered during the 1990s.  Although 
joint venturing appeared to be a “favoured” Ahold entry mechanism during this 
period, several of these operations, Poland (1995); Spain (1999); Brazil (2000); 
Malaysia (2000); Indonesia (2002); Argentina, Chile, Peru and Paraguay (2002), were 
subsequently taken under full control.  The financial crises which broke within Ahold 
in 2003 related to a combination of accounting irregularities in both the US 
Foodservice business and Disco, plus the inappropriate financial consolidation of 
most of the large joint ventures raising fundamental questions over internal control 
mechanisms and governance (Wrigley and Currah, 2003). 
 
This overview of the geographical patterns arising from internationalisation provides 
evidence of the disjointed nature of the retail internationalisation process.  After a 
period of rapid expansion into new markets during the 1990s, all three companies now 
appear to be engaged in a process of review and consolidation of their international 
activities.  A combination of changes in ownership and management, disputes with 
existing joint venture partners, regional economic crises, and the financial collapse of 
partners may provide as much an explanation for this pattern of expansion and 
consolidation as the assumption of clear strategic intent. 
 
Managerial Approach: market autonomy and adaptability 
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The second common theme in the literature is the nature of responsiveness or 
adaptation shown to local market conditions.  This theme encompasses the degree of 
market autonomy and adaptability arising from the management approach employed 
and is reflected in the operational support, format and brand strategies implemented.  
The position of the three case companies in respect of these factors is summarised in 
Table 6.   
 
i) corporate philosophy and approach 
 
In terms of the broad management approach to international activities, all three 
companies recognise a need for local market responsiveness, with the importance of 
“local” adaptation regularly articulated in company documentation.  For example, in 
2001 Delhaize described itself as “a federation of local companies, not a centralized, 
monolithic structure.  Therefore, the focus is on empowerment.”  (Annual Report, 
2001), and the localised nature of its operation is similarly emphasised today: “The 
group is committed to offering a locally differentiated shopping experience to 
customers in each of its markets, to deliver superior value and to maintaining high 
social, environmental and ethical standards” (Annual Report 2005)  Individual 
chains are free to devise their own operating positions based on local market 
knowledge.  Local market responsiveness backed by group synergies is a common 
theme as also articulated by Ahold : “Our strong retail and foodservice brands ensure 
we are optimally placed to answer our customers’ local needs.  At the same time, our 
brands benefit from group synergies that allow us to operate in a simple responsible 
and efficient way” (Annual Report 2005).  Even within the revised continental 
structure announced at the end of 2006, the support role is still emphasised : “..to 
leverage our continental capabilities and scale more effectively in support of our 
local operations” (Ahold Retail Review, 2006) 
  
    [Table 6 here] 
 
Despite these similar claims, corporate structure as projected through organisational 
charts suggests differences in approach, with Carrefour exhibiting a business format 
structure based on the core trading formats (hypermarkets, supermarkets, limited line 
discounters) within each country in which it operates, whilst Delhaize shows a 
 19
regional management structure supported by central business functions, a model that 
Ahold originally adopted with the formation of four market “arenas” (two in the USA, 
plus Albert Heijn and Central Europe) since realigned with the formation of two 
continental operating units to support “local banners”. 
 
ii) operational strategy and organizational learning 
 
The outcome of this managerial approach is essentially a pattern of “front” store 
adaptation and responsiveness to customer needs.  Given the claims that the grocery 
market is a “culture bound” sector, this is not surprising.   Behind the store front, 
however, central support for core business functions is increasingly common and this 
generally entails formal networks allowing information dissemination, benchmarking 
and exchange of best practice as the benefits of organisational learning are formally 
recognised by retailers (Palmer, 2005; Palmer and Quinn, 2005; Jonsson and Elg, 
2006).  The Delhaize strap-line of “Local Strength, Group Expertise” epitomises the 
typical approach.  Often this support is coordinated at a regional level. 
 
The development of such “backroom” integration allowing for knowledge transfer has 
been an ongoing process. In Ahold’s case the corporate support system has evolved 
from the Ahold Networking scheme formed in 1998.  This scheme had its origins in 
project specific synergy groups operating across the five American chains, which saw 
the exchange of EDLP expertise within the United States, and the transfer of retail 
brand and space management techniques from the Netherlands. Eventually “Project 
Complete” oversaw the integration of a range of corporate functions throughout the 
American chains, although individual store fascias were maintained.  During the rapid 
expansion of the late 1990s, the established retail businesses assumed mentoring roles 
in the developing markets (Albert Heijn supported business development in China, 
Central Europe and Spain; Giant in Thailand; Tops in Malaysia and Singapore; BiLo 
in Indonesia and Stop & Shop in Brazil) and a series of Ahold Competence Centres 
were founded.  The integration of the Central European operations maintained this 
trend prior to the formation of the regional “arenas” and the Business Support Office 
(to facilitate common initiatives) as part of the 2003 Recovery Plan.  Synergies in 
value repositioning, optimisation of the supply chain, new format development and 
private brand penetration plus group wide initiatives on general merchandise and the 
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creation of standardised retail systems were identified as potential benefits of this 
approach.  
 
Decentralised management is a central tenant of the Carrefour approach, whether at 
home or overseas.  Local national management teams are empowered, and historically 
individual hypermarket managers have had considerable autonomy over store 
operation (Burt, 1986; Dupuis, Choi and Larke 2006).  Homage to this philosophy is 
evident in Annual Reports: “Carrefour not only exports its unique retailing expertise 
to the countries in which it operates, it also strives to adapt to their specific 
environment at every level” (1994)  and “Although Carrefour is world-class in terms 
of size and the resources it allocates to growth, it has chosen to adapt its concepts to 
local cultures and consumer habits.  In this spirit, it relies on a decentralized 
organization formed from over 50 operating units.  Each one is responsible for 
developing a format and its product lines in one country.  This operating method 
relies on local initiative, thereby providing the best possible match of store 
configuration with customer expectations” (2002).  Operational implementation 
remains a local decision, and the group argues that although Carrefour, Champion and 
Dia are now global brands, close to 90% of inventory is local or regional allowing for 
local adaptation.  The tradename may be the same in different markets, but the offer 
varies.  Such operational decentralisation remains a consistent element of the 
company ethos, with each concept responsible for developing a format and 
product/service mix appropriate to the local market. 
 
As with Ahold and Carrefour, the Delhaize approach has been to support the various 
national businesses with group expertise and know-how.  An electronic financial 
reporting system allowing cross country benchmarking was introduced in 1999 and 
other examples of intra-group technology transfer include the implementation of 
central distribution and labour management software in the Czech Republic; category 
management in Thailand; and the adoption of the US inventory and margin 
management system in Belgium during 2005  In 2001 the group was restructured 
around three geographic regions (United States, Europe and Asia) supported by four 
group functions (finance, human resources, information technology, and legal affairs).  
This geographical structure has been accompanied by further “back-room” integration 
at regional level, for example the formation of European IT and Supply Chain 
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departments, and the co-ordination of retail product brand initiatives such as the 
launch of the “365” budget brand in Europe in 2004, and the development of a 
computer based food safety training programme by the American chains. 
 
iii) format and formulae development 
 
At the store level, while all three are becoming multi-format operations, core formats 
can be clearly identified.   Delhaize’s business is built upon the supermarket format: 
“Delhaize Group goes to the market with a variety of locally adapted store formats, 
of which the most common is the supermarket” (Annual Report, 2002).  In the US, 
Cub Foods (a large supermarket/superstore hybrid) was sold in 2001, and a  major 
initiative over the past two years has been the “renewal” programme involving 
segmentation of the supermarket format to include new formulae such as Sweetbay, 
Bloom and Bottom Dollar, each targeted at specific consumer segments.  Similarly in 
Europe following the successful development of a convenience store format in 
Belgium, the format was adopted in Greece, Germany, the Czech Republic and 
(before divestment) Singapore.  There is no evidence that Delhaize will move into the 
hypermarket format.   
 
Carrefour similarly, has historically seen most of its internationalisation strategy 
firmly rooted in a single format, the hypermarket.  Although investment in Comptoirs 
Modernes had seen the start of an embryonic supermarket business in Spain and 
Brazil, the Promodès merger was on a totally different scale and marked a clear shift 
into a multi-format internationalisation strategy.  In addition to the supermarket, the 
merger brought the limited line discount format into the group, despite Carrefour’s 
own failed attempts to internationalise Ed in both the UK and Italy.  Whether by 
strategic choice or expediency Carrefour now makes clear claims of format 
segmentation and of the scope to infill formats in international markets.  All three 
formats are currently found in France, Spain, Turkey, Greece, Argentina and Brazil.  
A hypermarket, supermarket and convenience store combination is found in Italy and 
Belgium, with a hypermarket and limited line discount format combination in China 
and a hypermarket and supermarket offer in Poland.  In Asia, with the exception of 
China an essentially mono-format (hypermarket) approach exists.  The multi-format 
approach is based on leveraging synergies from the hypermarket operation.  
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Hypermarkets establish the logistics and supply platform which then allows the 
development of smaller store formats. 
 
Finally, Ahold, like Delhaize, traditionally based its business on the supermarket.  
However, the rapid expansion of the group in the late 1990s transformed it into a 
multi-format operation with hypermarkets, superstores, convenience stores, discount 
stores and cash and carries in several of the markets in which it operated.  In the rush 
for floorspace which characterised Ahold’s moves in Latin America and Spain, the 
coherence of the format portfolio which evolved was not clear (Burt, Dawson and 
Larke 2006b).  This situation was addressed by the new management team put in 
place following the financial irregularities, who acknowledged that this approach had 
contributed to a lack of focus and structure: “we have been trying to be everything to 
everybody” (www.Ahold.com (2003)).  A period of retrenchment and realignment in 
formats, markets, processes and infrastructure followed resulting in recognition that 
the core strength of the business is “supermarkets based on quality”. 
 
The clarity of approach (or otherwise) taken to format strategy, is to some extent 
observed in corporate branding strategies.  As stated earlier, all three claim a 
managerial approach reflecting local market cultures and traditions, but the degree to 
which this is exhibited in store format branding varies.  Ahold has staunchly 
maintained a plethora of store formulas, often operating multiple fascias in the one 
market (e.g. Brazil and the USA).  Only in Asia was a single fascia, Tops, developed 
for supermarkets, while in Central Europe the hypermarkets adopted the Hypernova 
name.  The rationale for this multi-fascia approach was a belief that the local 
tradenames possessed an existing consumer franchise which should be maintained, 
while Ahold brought “behind-the-scenes” expertise to bear.  Delhaize has also tended 
to maintain the original store tradename and the launch of new formulas as part of the 
“renewal” programme in the US suggests that the localised approach remains 
fundamental to group strategy.  In Europe the same approach has generally been taken  
but has often involved the incorporation of  the Delhaize “lion” logo, particularly 
when building businesses from a low base.   
 
Carrefour, although maintaining five additional supermarket brands (Norte in 
Argentina; GS in Italy; GB in Belgium; Globi in Poland and Gima in Turkey); and 
 23
two additional discount store brands (Ed in France; Minpreco in Portugal), has 
pursued a greater degree of consolidation of store brand names at the format level, 
with a clear focus on Carrefour, Champion and Dia.  This has on occasion required 
major rebranding exercises for the hypermarkets (e.g. the conversion of Pryca and 
Continente in Spain, and GB in Belgium, to Carrefour).   As of 2006, the future of the 
Champion brand in Spain and Brazil is under review given store closures and 
conversion of others to a new Carrefour Express tradename and a larger Maxi-Dia 
format.  For the largely franchised convenience store network an array of inherited 
tradenames exist.   
 
The strategies pursued by all three reflect a combination of corporate perceptions and 
desires, plus the historical constitution of the group.  Where (typically) supermarket 
chains have been acquired or invested in (e.g. Ahold, and to a lesser extent Delhaize), 
the existing (and known) tradename is retained.  When a business has typically been 
grown organically there has been a greater tendency to introduce a common brand at 
the company, format or regional level.  
 
Conclusion: common themes, different processes? 
 
So where does this analysis leave us?  It is difficult from this review of three leading 
international grocery retailers to identify a single retail strategy for international 
grocery markets or a “preferred” model or approach to grocery internationalisation.  
The scope to develop and manage a truly “global” grocery chain, within the 
interpretations we normally place on this phrase, seems limited.    
 
On the evidence from these three cases we can identify common themes of generic 
strategy, but firm level implementation seems to vary by firm over time.  All show a 
strong commitment to retailing on the international stage and recognise the centrality 
of a customer focus, which is reflected in mission statements and company 
pronouncements.  However the scope of ambition varies and this may illustrate 
slightly different, but important perceptions of how these companies view the “globe” 
and act accordingly.  Although all three companies have a long track record of 
international activity, the pattern of internationalisation varies over both time and 
space, and the outcome of the internationalisation process in spatial terms is markedly 
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different.   Events rather than well-implemented pre-planned strategies may determine 
the spatial patterns we use as a basis for categorisation.  Since 2002 there are signs of 
a consolidation process underway, with focus upon “strong” markets and a rigorous 
review of activities in “weaker” markets leading to divestment in several instances. 
 
All three companies recognise the need for local market responsiveness (adaptation), 
and again this is clearly articulated in corporate statements.  This operational 
flexibility to gain cost economies of scope, is sought however via different routes and 
mechanisms.  The locus and degree of managerial autonomy and empowerment varies 
from the chain to the format to the regional level, and this is reflected in part by 
differing approaches to branding at format and product level.    Increasingly the 
organisational learning process is formalised, typified by centralised support of the 
local adaptation of retail operations, via various mechanisms for knowledge transfer, 
best practice dissemination and cross country benchmarking.  Similarly, there is 
evidence of a multi-format and multi-channel approach to markets, but underlying the 
internationalisation process in each case are core skills in specific formats which have 
provided market innovation and driven the internationalisation process, with varying 
degrees of success. 
 
Retail internationalisation is a process in which management learning is a core 
activity.  The reactions of (and in) host economies are important to the form and 
function of the business in each market, as are retrenchments and readjustments to 
market changes (Dawson 2003).  There is an inherent assumption in most existing 
academic interpretations of business outcomes, that strategy is coherent, consistent, 
and linear, and that the observed patterns in activities are clear and pre-determined.  
These overviews of three European grocery chains show how contested, punctuated 
and complex the internationalisation process is.  We acknowledge that the examples 
used here are to some extent “the usual suspects”.  The choice of other examples – 
Tesco, Auchan, Tengelmann or Rewe, Schwarz and Aldi – we argue would reveal 
other differences in approach.  As academics attempting to explain the 
internationalisation process we have spent an inordinate amount of time attempting to 
codify a very complex iterative learning process into simplified models and 
typologies (usually based on a two by two matrix).  In order to make sense of strategic 
business practices, and the outcomes which we tend to interpret, we need more 
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longitudinal and in-depth case histories and studies of many more retailers from 
different sectors, countries and with different histories.  Otherwise the search for order 
in  international retail strategies will remain a distraction, beset by personal and 
problematic categorizations based on partial evidence. 
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Table 1: Largest Grocery Based Retailers* in the World – Ranked by Sales, 2005 
 
Group Country of 
Origin 
Retail Banner 
Sales  
 (US$ mill) 
Net Sales 
 (US$ 
mill) 
% 
Grocery 
Sales 
% 
Foreign 
sales 
Wal-Mart USA 338,774 312,427 44.9 22.4 
Carrefour France 117,175 92,597 74.1 52.4 
Metro Group Germany 83,237 69,260 47.4 51.7 
Tesco UK 77,171 69,631 73.4 23.1 
Ahold Netherlands 76,774 55,307 84.0 82.0 
Seven & I Japan 69,237 35,324 72.0 34.0 
Kroger USA 63,702 60,553 70.5 0.0 
Rewe Germany 56,527 51,832 76.4 30.5 
Costco USA 56,456 52,935 60.2 20.5 
Casino France 53,842 28,347 74.7 41.8 
Aeon Japan 51,478 40,230 59.4 8.2 
Auchan France 51,273 38,216e 62.0 47.0 
Edeka Germany 50,131 41,266e 85.4 6.7 
Schwarz Group Germany 49,726 45,802e 82.5 43.3 
Aldi Germany 48,773 45,008e 83.3 44.7 
Albertsons USA 42,457 40,358 68.3 0.0 
Safeway USA 42,078 38,416 75.5 16.1 
Leclerc France 39,539 35,424 63.0 5.6 
ITM  France 36,556 37,724 66.0 10.0 
Tengelmann Germany 33,024 29,986e 65.7 50.8 
Woolworth Australia 31,086 27,090e 70.5 8.7 
Sainsbury UK 30,606 30,178 76.1 0.0 
Coles Myer Australia 30,150 27,853 52.0 0.6 
Loblaw Canada 24,994 22,943 77.4 0.0 
Delhaize Belgium 24,836 18,600 76.9 77.1 
* Retailers with 40%+ of sales in Grocery 
 
Source : derived from M+M Planet Retail 
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Table 2 : International Activities of Ahold, Carrefour and Delhaize Group:  1990, 
1995, 2000, 2005  
 
  
Number of Stores* Origin of Sales** AHOLD 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Total  1210 1767 4824 3455 100 100 100 100 
North America 341 636 1317 840 47.8 51.7 68.1 61.3 
Europe 
- Netherlands 
869 
869 
1131 
919 
3304 
2383
2615 
2113 
52.2 
52.2 
48.3 
40.9 
28.1 
15.6 
38.7 
32.8 
Latin America - - 106 - - - 2.4 - 
Asia - - 97 - - - 1.2 - 
* consolidated stores only. Unconsolidated stores +2542 (2005) 
** origin of sales exclude foodservice sales (retail sales only) 
 
 
Number of Stores * Origin of Sales CARREFOUR 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Total 340 968 5423 7003 100 100 100 100 
North America 1 - - - na - - - 
Europe 
- France 
312 
283 
898 
840 
4755 
1726
5762 
1664 
90.3 
68.8 
80.3 
62.0 
75.8 
52.5 
85.5 
47.8 
Latin America 26 57 574 817 9.7 17.2 14.8 6.8 
Asia 1 13 94 424 na 2.5 6.3 7.7 
* consolidated stores only. Unconsolidated stores +5025 (2005) 
 
 
Number of Stores Origin of Sales DELHAIZE 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Total 1195 1610 2310 2636 100 100 100 100 
North America 886 1086 1450 1537 69.5 68.1 77.4 71.5 
Europe 
- Belgium 
309 
278 
524 
450 
792 
615 
1053 
808 
30.5 
27.3 
31.9 
25.8 
21.7 
16.4 
26.4 
21.5 
Latin America - - - - - - - - 
Asia - - 68 46 - - 0.9 2.1 
 
 
Source: calculated from Annual Reports 
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Table 3 : Corporate Goals, Objectives and Intent 
 Ahold Carrefour  Delhaize Group 
Business 
Scope 
“International group of 
quality supermarkets and 
foodservice operators 
based in the United 
States and Europe” 
“An international multi-
format group” 
“A Belgian international 
food retailer with 
activities in eight 
countries on three 
continents” 
Corporate 
Goal/Vision/ 
Ambition 
“we make life easy for 
our customers to choose 
the best – for themselves 
and the people they care 
about” 
“the point of reference in 
modern food retailing” 
 
“to be one of the most 
admired international 
food retailers by its 
customers, its employees 
and its shareholders”  
Intent/ 
Approach 
“… an easy, convenient 
and appealing shopping 
experience through 
continual customer 
focus”; 
“we do this through our 
strong local brands and 
putting the customer at 
the heart of every 
decision” 
“strength in diversity”; 
“expansion of powerful 
and complimentary 
networks that can meet the 
needs of local customers 
worldwide”; 
a multi-format strategy – 
“appealing to all types of 
customer profiles and of 
meeting their full range of 
needs”; 
“to offer the customer the 
greatest freedom of choice 
with the guarantee of the 
best quality/price ratio, 
whatever the store format”  
“leading positions in 
food retailing in key 
markets.  These positions 
are built through strong 
regional companies 
going to market in a 
variety of food store 
formats.”; 
“the group is committed 
to offering a locally 
differentiated shopping 
experience to customers 
in each of its markets, to 
deliver superior value 
and to maintaining high 
social, environmental and 
ethical standards”   
Core 
Capabilities/ 
Strategic 
Levers 
Applied customer insight 
Superior category 
management 
Strategic sourcing 
End-to-end supply chain 
Excellent store 
operations 
Multi-format growth 
- complimentarity and 
synergy 
Common strategic 
positions: 
- price leader in catchment 
area; 
- excel at mastering costs; 
- optimal development of 
capital employed 
- purchasing synergies 
Concept leadership 
Executional excellence 
 
Learning organization 
Attractive workplace 
Responsible corporate 
citizen 
 
 
 
Source : derived from Annual Reports, Websites and Company Documentation 
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 Table 4: Geographical Presence: Spread; Scope and Entry Methods 
 Ahold Carrefour  Delhaize Group 
Geographical 
Spread 
11 markets on 3 
continents; previously 
27 markets on 4 
continents 
USA dominant 
contributor to sales; 
failing in Asia before 
financial problems 
30 markets on 3 continents 
plus franchise partners in a 
further 9 countries; 
failed in USA;  
willingness to return to 
previously exited markets, 
not always successful 
now 5 markets on 3 
continents, in 204 10 
markets on 3 continents;  
USA dominant 
contributor to sales 
Geographical 
Pattern 
USA in mid 1970s and 
consolidation since; 
entry into Asia/Latin 
America in 1990s;  
relatively limited 
European expansion - 
S&C Europe, and 
latterly Scandinavia & 
Baltics; post 2000 
divestment of non-core 
markets – retreat from 
Asia and Americas and 
focus on “core” markets 
in USA and Europe 
core European markets in 
early/mid 1970s;  
exit and retrench to “latin” 
markets in early 1980s; 
spread through Asia and 
Europe in l990s;  
Asia, Middle East, Latin 
America in late 1990s; 
post 2000 divestment from 
markets on all continents 
where position is weak  
USA in mid 1970s and 
consolidation since; 
other early moves in 70s-
80s withdrawn;  
during 1990s expanded 
to S&C Europe and Asia 
in late 1990s; 
retrenchment since 2003 
by divesting smaller 
markets were leading 
position unatainable 
Entry Method acquisition in USA;  
JV elsewhere, often 
rising to majority (but 
forced ?); in past a 
number of “multi-
country” entrants via 
single JV 
initially JV moving to 
ownership where 
committed;  
merger with Promodès 
reinforced market presence 
and added franchises 
management control 
either via dominant JV or 
majority shareholding 
 
Source : derived from Annual Reports, Websites and Company Documentation 
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Table 5 : Geographical Spread : Country and Year of Entry/Exit 
 
Locations Ahold Carrefour Delhaize 
North America 
- USA 
 
1977 
 
1988-93 
 
1974 
Europe 
- Austria 
- Belgium 
- Czech Rep 
- Cyprus 
- Denmark 
- Estonia 
- Finland 
- France 
- Germany 
- Greece 
- Italy 
- Latvia 
- Lithuania 
- Netherlands 
- Norway 
- Poland 
- Portugal 
- Romania 
- Slovakia 
- Spain 
- Turkey 
- Sweden 
- Switzerland 
- UK 
 
- 
- 
1991 
- 
2000-2004 
2000 
2000 
- 
- 
- 
- 
2000 
2000 
Home 
2000 
1995-2007 
1992 
- 
2001 
1976-85; 1996-98; 1999-2004 
- 
2000 
- 
- 
 
1976-80 
1969-1978; 1999 
1998-2005 
2005 
- 
- 
- 
Home 
1977-79 
1999 
1969-75;1980-84;1993 
- 
- 
- 
2003-2005 
1998 
1991 
2001 
2000-2005 
1973 
1993-96;1999 
- 
1970-91; 2000 
1972-83; 1993-95 
 
- 
Home 
1991-2007 
 
- 
- 
- 
1994-2001 
1977-79; 2003 
1992 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
1981-1992 
2000 
1998-2005 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Latin America 
- Argentina 
- Brazil 
- Chile 
- Columbia 
- Costa Rica 
- El Salvador 
- Guatemala 
- Honduras 
- Mexico 
- Nicaragua 
- Paraguay 
- Peru 
 
1998-2004 
1996-2005 
1998-2003 
- 
2002-2005 
2000-2005 
2000-2005 
2000-2005 
- 
2002-2005 
1998-2003 
1998-2003 
 
1982 
1975 
1998-2003 
1998 
- 
- 
- 
- 
1994-2005 
- 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Asia 
- China 
- Hong-Kong 
- Japan  
- Indonesia 
- Malaysia 
- Singapore 
- South Korea 
- Taiwan 
- Thailand 
 
1996-1999 
- 
- 
1997-2003 
1996-2003 
1996-2003 
- 
- 
1997-2004 
 
1995 
1996-2000 
2000-2005 
1998 
1994 
1997 
1996-2006 
1989 
1996 
 
- 
- 
- 
1997 
- 
1999-2003 
- 
- 
1997-2004 
Other 
- Egypt 
- Lebanon 
- Qatar 
- Saudi Arabia 
- Tunisia 
- UAE 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
2001 
2003 
2002 
2004 
2001 
1999 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
Source: calculated from Annual Reports 
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Table 6 : Managerial Approach : Market Autonomy and Adaptability 
 
 Ahold Carrefour  Delhaize Group 
Managerial 
Approach  
“common set of values 
and core capabilities  
will help us to act as 
one company and 
capitalise on scale 
scope and expertise.  At 
the same time our 
businesses maintain 
strong individual 
identities to best serve 
customers at the local 
level” 
“an international group, a 
local operator”;  
autonomy of markets at 
operational level; 
local player in each market 
- “respectful of local 
lifestyles and culture”; 
 “the international 
development of various 
formats is accompanied by 
great flexibility in 
adopting to local cultures 
and situations” 
“international group of 
local companies”; 
high level of local 
management 
responsibility “to fully 
address their local 
consumer needs” and 
“motivate local 
management”;   
 
Managerial 
Support 
Strategy  
Arenas (regional 
marketplaces) with 
integrated support 
service organizations; 
standard retail systems; 
learning organization to 
improve core 
capabilities and work as 
one team.  From 2007 
arena structure 
consolidated into two 
continental retail 
divisions 
country structure (within 
regions) with each country 
controlling and responsible 
for operational activities; 
within each country a 
decentralised business line 
(format) structure 
operates; 
country level functional 
support is provided to 
formats and networks with 
other countries to 
exchange best practices 
and for specified projects  
geographical regional 
structure and knowledge 
transfer; 
central group support in 
financial, human 
resources, IT and legal 
services wich 
allows group synergies 
and exchange of best 
practices 
Format 
Strategy 
primarily supermarket, 
other formats eg 
hypermarket, inherited 
from JV or developed 
in discrete markets (eg 
Central Europe); 
initially hypermarket 
based with limited 
supermarket development; 
since Promodès, multi-
format with hypermarket, 
supermarket and limited 
line discount store as core 
formats; neighbourhood 
stores in some markets 
supermarket format 
dominant, no 
hypermarkets, some 
neighbourhood store and 
c-store development in 
Europe 
Brand Strategy maintain local store 
brand name/format 
name; retail product 
brand expertise 
transferred 
consolidation of brand 
name where possible – 
Carrefour, Champion, Dia;  
local brand name retained 
where significant chain 
acquired;  
retail product brand range 
transferred 
local name maintained; 
Lion logo incorporated in 
some European and 
Asian markets;  
retail product brand 
range transferred eg 
“365” budget range in 
Europe 
 
Source : derived from Annual Reports, Websites and Company Documentation 
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Figure 1 : 
Global Spread of Selected Grocery Retailers, 2004
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Source: Retail Forward (2005)  
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